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I. INTRODUCTION: WHOSE MARKET IS IT, ANYWAY?

Between September 2008 and February 2009, the Dow Jones
Industrial Average (“DJIA”) slowly and steadily lost over 30%, eradicating
trillions of dollars of wealth.2 The nation’s stock exchanges did not close,
slow, or cease during this painstaking decline.3 The thirty-five or so bills
proposed by Congress in the intervening legislative session variously
1
J. Scott Colesanti is an Associate Professor of Legal Writing at the Hofstra University Maurice A.
Deane School of Law, where he has taught Securities Regulation every year since 2002. Professor
Colesanti, a former industry regulator and arbitrator for 10 years each, has had numerous articles
published on securities fraud. He has lectured domestically and abroad on the financial crisis, its primary
causes, and its inspired remedies. Professor Colesanti wishes to thank Allyson M. Beach, Hofstra Law
Class of 2015, for her diligent assistance with the research for this Article.
2
See Chronology of Dow Jones Industrial Average, http://www.islandnet.com/~kpolsson/dow
jones/dow1954.htm (last visited April 8, 2014) (highlighting bleak periods in the Dow’s recent history).
3
See Colin Clark, Updating the Market-Wide Circuit Breaker, http://exchanges.nyx.com/colinclark/updating-market-wide-circuit-breaker (last visited April 9, 2014) (“You may not even know this
market-wide circuit breaker exists. It has only been triggered one day (October 27, 1997) in 23 years.”).
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offered to reform the exchanges, securities industry regulatory agencies,
market players, trading practices, and individual investments.4 The law
pressed by the White House to passage in 2010 left the day-to-day operation
of market centers out of the mix.5
The losses were replaced – at least on paper – in March 2013, when
the DJIA regained its pre-Crisis, October 2007 zenith of 14,000.6 That same
month, securities regulators finalized rules that ostensibly provided
protection against swift market downturns.7 In the interim, during those
harrowing half-dozen years, investors witnessed debate over the proper level
of regulation of banks, brokerages, brokers and investments, as well as the
degree of severity of sanctions meted out to Crisis villains. But stock
exchange volatility remained largely unhindered, as it does today.
And so, like the highways that go without repair while automobiles
are increasingly regulated, so too have the nation’s securities exchanges8
avoided meaningful reform.
To be sure, a blithe response to tremulous stock exchanges can be
said to be traditional. Throughout the nation’s history, the scholars stopping
to decry wonton capitalism have often spared its chief conduit substantive
critique. The seminal Other People’s Money by Louis Brandeis noted
blandly in 1914 that the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) housed
4
See, e.g., Financial Regulation Reform Act of 2008, S. 3691, 110th Cong. (2008) (requiring
reporting and recordkeeping of credit-default swaps); Financial Market Investigation, Oversight, and
Reform Act of 2008, S. 3652, 110th Cong. (2008) (establishing a Commission, Joint Select Committee,
and a Special Inspector General); Derivatives and Hedge Fund Regulatory Improvement Act of 2008, S.
3739, 110th Cong. (2008) (“To address the regulation of derivatives and unregistered hedge funds . . . .”);
H.R. 2868, 110th Cong. (2007) (“To eliminate the exemption from State regulation for certain securities
designated by national securities exchanges.”).
5
See DEP’T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING
FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009). The White House’s detailed description of planned
changes for American investors and homeowners did not include modifications to stock exchange
operations. Id.; see also the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, 12
U.S.C. § 5301 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank].
6
See Dow Jones Historical Average – Historical Charts, YAHOO FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/
echarts?s=%5EDJI+Interactive (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
7
Regulatory Systems Compliance and Integrity, SEC Release No. 34-69077 (March 8, 2013),
available at www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2013/34-69077.pdf.
8
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1) (2006) (“(1) The term ‘exchange’ means any organization, association, or
group of persons, whether incorporated or unincorporated, which constitutes, maintains, or provides a
market place or facilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities or for otherwise
performing with respect to securities the functions commonly performed by a stock exchange as that term
is generally understood, and includes the market place and the market facilities maintained by such
exchange.”); 17 C.F.R. § 242.300(a)(1) (2013) (“(a) Alternative trading system means any organization,
association, person, group of persons, or system: (1) That constitutes, maintains, or provides a market
place or facilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities or for otherwise performing
with respect to securities the functions commonly performed by a stock exchange . . . .”); Jerry W.
Markham & Daniel J. Harty, For Whom the Bell Tolls: the Demise of Exchange Trading Floors and the
Growth of ECNS, 33 J. CORP. L. 865, 866 (2008) (Notes that this expansion by the SEC paved the way
for numerous non-conventional/non-traditional securities marketplaces, initially resulting in a
proliferation of “Electronic Communication Networks”, or “ECNs,” and asserting that “[t]he amazing
growth of the ECNs and their displacement of the traditional exchanges have raised regulatory
concerns.”).
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“[o]nly a part” of market securities.9 Likewise, the remedial legislation
adopted after the Great Depression sought merely to establish a chain of
review that firmly established the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) atop a pyramid that relied heavily on self-regulation at its base.10
More recently, pundits were equally nonplussed, opining that economic
historians had concluded that the stock market swoon of 1929 itself was
more an effect of the deepening Depression than its cause.11
A. For Which Customers?
Part of the indifference, no doubt, traces to the market’s fluid and
inscrutable clientele. “Direct participation” in the stock market is, at best, a
misleading term; an individual investor – not rising to the level of a stock
exchange member – relies on his order being grouped with others at his
accountholder’s firm or simply being satisfied by the brokerage itself from
an internal account.12 In recent times, there has sprung the notion of
“indirect” participation to connote both the increasing involvement of
pooled investments (e.g., retirement plans and pensions) and a citizenry
more sensitive to market fluctuations. Concurrently, a 1998 study
concluded that nearly half of all American households had become
indirectly involved with the market.13
Not surprisingly, the data concerning a typical trading day at the
major stock exchanges never quite clarifies how much buying and selling
was ultimately institutional (as opposed to retail, or individual). Mutual
funds buy scores of individual stocks and thus their numbers are hopelessly
intermingled; separately, we know that pension plans and retirement funds
are weighty but not majority players.14 The most precise evidence speaks to
the practices of market professionals, which reflect the complexity and risk
inherent in a “routine” day in the life of a stock exchange.
From this evidence, we know that short selling, “program trading,”
9

LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 7 (1914).
See the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(d) (2012) [hereinafter Exchange Act]
(establishing the Securities and Exchange Commission).
11
See, e.g., Paul Alexander Gusmorino III, Main Causes of the Great Depression, GUSMORINO
WORLD (May 13, 1996), http://www.gusmorino.com/pag3/greatdepression/index.html.
12
See DOUG HENWOOD, WALL STREET: HOW IT WORKS AND FOR WHOM? 17–19 (1997)
(describing the route of an order from customer to stock exchange floor).
13
Harrison Hong et al., Social Interaction and Stock-Market Participation, 59 J. FIN. 137, 137
(2004), available at http://www.princeton.edu/~hhong/jfsocial.pdf (noting that in 1998 48.9% of
American households owned stock either directly or indirectly, a figure representing a 17% increase in a
decade).
14
See Greg Smith, How Wall Street Is Still Rigging the Game, TIME, Nov. 5, 2012, at 18 (“The
secret that Wall Street doesn’t want anyone to know is that hedge funds comprise less than 5% of assets
in the stock market. The real big players in the market are individual households and the pension funds,
mutual funds, university endowments, charities and foundations that are entrusted with your savings,
donations, retirement funds and 401(k)s – trillions and trillions of dollars that are invested with Wall
Street banks.”); see generally Greg Smith, WHY I LEFT GOLDMAN SACHS: A WALL STREET STORY
(2012).
10
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and proprietary trading (by firms for firms) are common practices of market
professionals. “Short interest” reports disclose the monthly amount of shares
that have been sold as part of a strategy of sell now, buy shares to cover the
sale later.15 Program trading, a computerized practice employed by large
brokerage firms for decades, connotes a wide range of trading strategies
centering on an investment of at least $1 million in a basket of at least 15
stocks.16 Astonishingly, the calculation of program trading reveals a number
phrased in percent of daily trading volume that has, at times, nearly reached
50% of all exchange volume.17 Combining short sales, program trading, and
an indeterminable volume of firms trading for themselves, the stock market
is a game in which the individual investor (even when represented by
institutions) is, at best, a minority player.
B. Storied But Forgotten
Nonetheless, despite any precision in identifying exactly which
clientele are being foremost served, the “stock market” is the most visible
and time-honored of our economic indicators.18 Further, the notion of a
continuous and fair trading center for stocks and bonds still attends all
perceptions of developed economies.19 While traditionally the stock
exchange either assisted with capital formation or provided a reprieve from

15
See Short Interest, NASDAQ.COM, http://www.nasdaq.com/quotes/short-interest.aspx (last visited
Feb. 24, 2014); see also Brigitte Yuille, Short Selling: Introduction, INVESTOPEDIA.COM,
http://www.investopedia.com/university/shortselling (last visited Feb. 24, 2014) (explaining that a short
sale is a legal but speculative practice of selling a stock not yet owned or borrowed, and that the
practitioner profits from the spread between the sale price and the price of the subsequent “covering”
transaction).
16
See Press Release, NYSE, Program Trading Averaged 26.4 Percent of NYSE Volume during July
8-12 (July 18, 2013), http://www.nyse.com/press/1374142974235.html; Program Trading,
INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/programtrading.asp (last visited Feb. 24,
2014).
17
See Press Release, NYSE, Program Trading Averaged 48.6 Percent of NYSE Volume during June
22-26 (July 7, 2009), http://www.nyse.com/press/1246962735805.html (reporting that in June of 2009,
Program Trading accounted for over 48% of all volume on the NYSE in one business week).
18
For purposes of this Article, the “stock market” connotes the major stock exchanges in the United
States. The New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) and the NASDAQ stock exchange (“NASDAQ”)
house listings which comprise all 30 companies constituting the famed Dow Jones Industrial Average.
See Companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average, CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/data/dow30/
(last visited Feb. 24, 2014); see generally David Escobar, Stock Exchanges and History of Stock
Exchanges, EZINE @RTICLES (July 5, 2010), http://ezinearticles.com/?Stock-Exchanges-and-History-ofStock-Exchanges&id=4608793 (describing the fabled “Customer Afternoon Letter” first circulated by
Charles Dow). But see SEC, Joint Industry Plans, Exchange Act Release No. 34-67091, 103 S.E.C.
Docket 2760, 2012 WL 1963373 (May 31, 2012) (stating that there are currently at least 10 other
American stock exchanges routinely recognized by the press, regulators, and other interested parties like
the National Stock Exchange and the Chicago Stock Exchange).
19
Economists often link a successful stock to a reputational economy. The stock exchanges charge
a commission to each member based upon revenues (calculated by shares executed) that is required by
rule to be meticulously and timely tallied each month. See NYSE Information Memo No. 96-12, Form
600TC/Floor Brokerage and Commissions Reporting (Apr. 4, 1996), http://www.nyse.com/nysenotices/
nyse/information-memos/detail?memo_id=96-12 (Explains that monthly form 600TC required of all
members must record floor brokerage revenue including “income received from non-member brokerdealers as well as public institutional and retail customers.”).
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fraud,20 in modern times the goals seem expedient at best, and, at worst,
dangerously cloistered.21 Sometime in the past 100 years, the American
“stock exchange” appears to have become a behemoth, susceptible to only
self-supervision, and bounded by crude mechanistic inhibitors. This largely
unnoticed reality22 may prove catastrophic the next time the nation’s biggest
banks suddenly disclose billions of dollars in losses.23
Over the past 25 years, as various American stock exchanges have
become inextricably linked24 they have (reluctantly) safeguarded against
intolerable volatility by instituting so-called “circuit breakers,”inorganic
operational halts tantamount to shutting off the lights and praying for the
weekend.25 Regrettably, what has emerged is a cottage industry in a
skyscraper world. To wit, as regulators and regulated entities alike have
come to be far more concerned with ensuring that a stock exchange index
ascend without interruption than with preventing its cataclysmic fall,
oversight measures have been left to the exchanges themselves. These
exchange-implemented measures have at various times proven to be
mythical, belated, superficial, and, worst of all, self-serving.
Accordingly, this article examines the reasons for, and
efficaciousness of, stock exchange regulation of volatile trading. Part II
introduces some of the most storied tales dotting the Anglo-Saxon/American
timeline regarding the birth of stock exchanges and their near collapse,
including three American market disasters of recent times. Part III
examines the legal responses to these epic downturns, both those proposed
by the exchanges and explored by the SEC. Part IV advances two
proposals: (1) re-implementing some traditional market safeguards, and (2)
adopting more meaningful brakes on rapidly escalating indices and highspeed trading. Part V concludes by reminding of the dangers of the
20

See infra notes 43–48 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 43–48 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Nathaniel Popper, The Big Board, in One Big Gulp, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2013, at BU1
(“[S]tock exchanges are probably a bit like plumbing. Most of us don’t think much about them – until
something goes wrong.”).
23
See John Cassidy, Subprime Suspect: The Rise and Fall of Wall Street’s First Black C.E.O., NEW
YORKER, Mar. 31, 2008, at 78 (detailing Merrill Lynch’s billions of dollars in losses due to a
concentration in collateralized debt obligations).
24
See Regulation NMS, 17 C.F.R. § 242.600 (2013). In 1995, the Securities and Exchange
Commission adopted Regulation NMS to require, among other things, that all domestic exchanges
display the lowest price for an offered security. Id.; Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 3451808, 85 S.E.C. Docket 1642, 2005 WL 1364545 (June 9, 2005). In similar vein, effective October 1,
2012, all national securities exchanges were required by the SEC “to submit a national market system
(“NMS”) plan to create, implement, and maintain a consolidated order tracking system, or consolidated
audit trail . . . [and to report] order event information for orders . . . across all markets, from the time of
order inception through routing, cancellation, modification, or execution.” Consolidated Audit Trail,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-67457, 104 S.E.C. Docket 748, 2012 WL 2927797, 1 (July 18, 2012).
25
See CHARLES GASPARINO, KING OF THE CLUB/RICHARD GRASSO AND THE SURVIVAL OF THE
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 58–61 (2007) (explaining the decision by Exchange management to
“slow down the [trade order entry] process” in response to the market crash of 1987). Such decision was
implemented as NYSE Rule 80B. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
21
22
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continued sugar-coating of stock market swings – at least insofar as “retail
investors” are concerned.26
Overall, as the nation forges through its second greatest economic
downturn,27 this article urges greater action to forestall yet another wave of
long-term investors being victimized by marketplaces seemingly concerned
foremost with keeping the center functional for professional traders for
another day – in essence, trading for the sake of trading professionals, with
unprecedented volatility being a problem for other people.
II. BACKGROUND: ‘IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE,’
BOTH ORGANIZED AND UNORGANIZED
In December 1996, then Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan
interrupted a jovial period of market expansion to publicly comment that
stock prices seemed to reflect an “irrational exuberance” among investors.28
But frankly, quixotic stock pricing has been with us for centuries, and has
consistently been succumbed to by expert and layman alike. Of greater
import, speculative trading frenzy and the resulting internecine volatility
predates organized stock exchanges, proving that the fault lied in ourselves
before the stars even took shape.
Concomitantly, while casting blame on cyclical zeniths of greed
may be convenient, such aspersions on human nature educate us minimally
on the reasons why citizens have tolerated clumsy, merciless stock
exchanges for so long. An indelible characteristic is clear: governments are
usually inextricably linked to stock exchanges, either in their inspiration or
continuance.

26
For purposes of this article, the “retail investor” is an individual with an order valued at less than
$50,000.
27
Joan Indiana Rigdon, Government Handouts: Federal Bailout Money Comes With Strings,
WASHINGTON LAWYER 24 (July/August 2009) (“As the nation plods through the worst recession since
the Great Depression . . . .”). Of course, in terms of raw numbers (e.g., market capitalization lost), the
current downturn may be the greatest collapse of all time. Cf. DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST 265
(2009) (“More than eighteen months after the Great Panic [of 2008] began, more than a year after Bear
Stearns was rescued, more than six months after Lehman collapsed and AIG became a ward of the state,
more than a hundred days into the Obama presidency, it was still not entirely clear that [Federal Reserve
Chairman] Ben Bernanke and his allies . . . had succeeded at preventing what Bernanke called
Depression 2.0.”).
28
J. Scott Colesanti, "Circuit Breakers" and the Mission of Stock Market Stability, 15 NEXUS: CHAP.
J.L. & POL'Y 43, 53 (2010) (quoting Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., The Challenge of
Central Banking in a Democratic Society, Remarks at the Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture of
The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (Dec. 5, 1996),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/19961205.htm) (“But how do we know when
irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to unexpected and
prolonged contractions as they have in Japan over the past decade? . . . We as central bankers need not be
concerned if a collapsing financial asset bubble does not threaten to impair the real economy, its
production, jobs, and price stability.”).
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A. The Origins of Stock Exchanges
The concept of a centralized marketplace for the trading of financial
instruments is actually younger than the ideas for indoor plumbing or a
suspension bridge. The notion of a marketplace for “bonds” traces to Italy
in the Twelfth Century, when local rulers paid 5% interest on “loans” from
their citizens.29 Indeed, historians often have found the roots of exchanges
in informal marketplaces trading government-issued debt,30 and the word
“stock” itself emanates from the wooden object once used to record interest
payments (and thus partially forgive loans) from the local government.31
The first stock exchange or “bourse”32 hales from Amsterdam circa
1610, centuries after the bonds issued by Italian municipal officials.34 The
Amsterdam exchange was said to have been primarily formulated to
facilitate trading in the stocks and bonds of the Dutch East India Company,35
also credited with originating the notion of an Initial Public Offering.36 The
enduring Dutch stamp on our modern version of the securities marketplace
remains a “meeting-place” for bankers, dealers, and others.37
33

Years later, wholly apart from the marketplace for stock, Europe fell
prey to Holland’s “Tulip Bulb Craze” of the 1630s, proving that the
emergence of the formal bourse would neither meet nor curtail the need for
lazy profit. In that craze, speculators attempted to create a centralized market
for converting a faddish craze for tulip bulbs into healthy profit. The storied
testament to avarice was said to have been at once so frantic and egalitarian as
to ensnare “[n]obles, citizens, farmers, mechanics, seamen, footmen, maidservants, even chimney sweeps and old clotheswomen . . . .”38
The first noteworthy “crash” of the British stock market occurred in
1696, and is attributed to fears over currency devaluations, ultimately
dooming 100 British and Scottish public companies.39 In what would prove
to be a recurring pattern for the ages, brokers were blamed for acting solely
29

Kenneth Silber, The Earliest Securities Markets: Stocks and Bonds Have Origins Stretching Back
Across the Centuries, THINK ADVISOR (Feb. 1, 2009), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2009/02/01/theearliest-securities-markets.
30
B. MARK SMITH, A HISTORY OF THE GLOBAL STOCK MARKET 19–20 (2003) (The British Crown’s
issuance of annuities in 1693 and 1694 “to raise money for seemingly never-ending military expenditures
. . . .”).
31
Id. at 20.
32
Id. at 14–15. The term “bourse”—still common today in European exchange names—means
“purse” but is more likely attributable to the family Van der Bourse, leading Dutch financiers in the
Sixteenth Century. Id. at 15 (citing Seventeenth Century author Samuel Ricard).
33
Id. at 18–21.
34
Id. at 12–15.
35
Escobar, supra note 18.
36
Id.
37
SMITH, supra note 30, at 15 (citing Seventeenth Century author Samuel Ricard).
38
BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 36 (6th ed. 1996).
39
SMITH, supra note 30, at 22 (noting that the number 100 represented approximately two-thirds of
all companies listed on the London Stock Exchange at that time).
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in self-interest, leading to legislation in 1697 designed to “refrain the
number and ill-practices of brokers and stock-jobbers.”40
Subsequently, the storied British South Sea Bubble of 1720, as a
noted economist highlighted, centered on stock foisted upon the public but
nonetheless owned in part by “Half of the House of Lords and more than
Half of the House of Commons . . . .”41 The resulting crash manifested itself
in waves throughout various European nations. Again, the British response
was remedial legislation, this time aimed at investment vehicles and
speculative trading practices.42
Across the pond in America, the Great Depression can surely be
seen as an equal opportunity chasm, effecting bankers and their depositors
alike. The problem lay not with the lure of the stock exchange, but rather
with the spirit of invulnerability that defied economic stratification,
regardless of market access. As the period’s chief chronicler explained,
there existed across the sociological divide a perverted American spirit, and
a people “displaying an inordinate desire to get rich quickly with a
minimum of physical effort.”43 Not surprisingly, the populist President
initiated legislative reforms aimed at making markets more egalitarian, with
a resolute government watchdog overseeing the federalization of what had
traditionally been covered by State law.44 The ribald tales of Franklin
Delano Roosevelt’s (“FDR”) ensuing paternalism towards American
investors45 are well-known; less understood, however, are the reasons that
domestic stock exchanges even originated in the first place.
B. The American Model
Because greed and panic-selling pre-dated, and have in many
instances existed outside of, stock exchange trading,46 the lineage of the
exchanges must be more practically defined. Each of the American stock
exchanges initially organized for at least one of the following two reasons:
(1) the desire to minimize opportunities for fraud, and (2) the need to bring
40

Id. at 22−23.
MALKIEL, supra note 38, at 40–41.
Id. at 45. Specifically, the Sir John Bernard’s Act of 1734 banned, among other things, trading in
options and futures, and short-selling. Id. But see REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE STOCKEXCHANGE, RELATIVE TO THE LATE FRAUD 6–8 (1814), https://ia600506.us.archive.org/2/items/report
ofsubcommi13stoc/reportofsubcommi13stoc.pdf (detailing a separate and later British Crown inquiry
into a later London Stock Exchange fraud which concluded that losses could largely be attributed to an
unforeseen forgery by a sole counterparty).
43
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH: 1929 3–4 (7th ed. 1997) (also noting that the
perversion afflicted not only the Astors and the Rockefellerswho clung to the resilience of “Blue Chip
stocks”but also the market newcomer of the 1920s, who found himself (like the real estate speculator)
able to buy a sizeable amount of stock with 10% down).
44
See CHARLES R. GEISST, WALL STREET: A HISTORY 233–243 (1997).
45
See GALBRAITH, supra note 43, at 12–22, 36–37 (describing the alluring margin market of the
1920s); GEISST, supra note 44, at 235 (describing the appointment of the first S.E.C. Chairmana
former manipulative “market operator”as placing a “fox to guard the henhouse”).
46
See supra pp. 7–8.
41
42
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small companies to market. For example, the NYSE, the largest and oldest
of America’s financial battlefields,47 was itself formed to wrest authority
from manipulative New York “street” brokers of the late Eighteenth Century
who had succumbed to the charms of an over-extended (and eventually
imprisoned) nobleman.48 Likewise, the Philadelphia Stock Exchange—the
rival to the NYSE for the moniker of first American stock exchange49—is
recalled as the entity enabling a market that responded to both the same New
York nobleman’s fraud and a local health epidemic.50
A second reason for stock exchanges in America would appear to be
the need to serve local markets.51 Because the largest stock exchanges have
high costs and listing requirements,52 or simply because a fledgling
company need not reach a national audience, local market centers have
sprung up and survived. These smaller marketplaces have grown in
importance as SEC rules have mandated that all exchanges provide the same
pricing information (and thus, trading opportunities) to their customers.53
Yet since 2008, the number of domestic initial public offerings (IPOs) has
halved54 while average trading volume on the stock exchanges has increased
dramatically, indicating that the goal of bringing companies to market has,
at best, been subjugated to other activities at the exchanges.
Regardless of their primary purpose, today’s American stock
47
See, e.g., Popper, supra note 22, at BU1 (calling the NYSE “the largest stock exchange in the
nation and the world”).
48
GEISST, supra note 44, at 11–12. Geisst detailed the need for an exclusionary club to avoid the
unfair practices that had been exploited by the notorious “merchant speculator” William Duer:
Recognizing the need to clean up their operations, the dealers and auctioneers
entered the Buttonwood Agreement in May 1792. Meeting under a buttonwood
tree, today the location of 68 Wall Street, the traders agreed to establish a formal
exchange for the buying and selling of shares and loans. The new market would
be more structured, conducted without the manipulative auctions. This market
would be continual throughout the prescribed trading period, and a commission
structure would be established. All of those signing the agreement would charge
each other a standard commission for dealing. Those not signing but still
intending to trade would be charged a higher commission.
Id. at 13.
49
See The Philadelphia Stock Exchange, WALL STREET & TECH., http://www.wallstreetandtech.
com/photos/tradingfloors/phlx (“The Philadelphia Stock Exchange, created in 1790, was the first U.S.
stock exchange.”).
50
DOMENIC VITIELLO WITH GEORGE E. THOMAS, THE PHILADELPHIA STOCK EXCHANGE AND THE
CITY IT MADE 40–42 (2010).
51
See Steve Greechie, Answer to “Why Was the American Stock Exchange Started?”, ANSWERBAG
(Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.answerbag.com/q_view/1902469 (explaining that the American Stock
Exchange formed to trade shares “too small to be listed on the NYSE”).
52
See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 102.01 (2013), http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/Help/
mapContent.asp?sec=lcm-sections&title=sx-ruling-nyse-policymanual_102.01&id=chp_1_2_2_1
(detailing requirement of $40 million market value of publicly held shares and $10 million in pre-tax
earnings for the 3 years prior to listing application).
53
See CONSOLIDATED AUDIT TRAIL, supra note 24 (discussing the “National Market System” and
pricing).
54
See IPO Pricings, RENAISSANCE CAPITAL IPO CENTER, www.renaissancecapital.com/IPOHome/
Press/IPOPricings.aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2014) (disclosing an average of approximately 200 IPOs per
year between 2004 and 2007 and 100 per year for the period of 2008 through 2012).
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exchange serves as a focal point for the nation’s ever-increasing need of
economic reassurance.55 Euphemisms such as “corrections,” “recessions,”
and “bubble bursts” have not only taken root in economic vernacular, but
make a bit more palatable the seemingly inevitable cycle of outrageous
fortune and collective despair. Without fanfare, economists describe the
characteristics of market setbacks, in words that are hauntingly familiar:
The ingredients of financial panics are boringly repetitive.
Past panics fade from memory. Financial institutions figure
out ways to circumvent the regulations established to
prevent those past panics from happening again. Rising
asset prices enable easier credit and vice versa. Market
euphoria grips increasing numbers.
Risks are
underestimated. Quick, large fortunes are made and
flaunted. Everyone seeks to ride the economic boom times
to great wealth. All the conditions are in place for
something significant to go wrong.56
Additionally, the faith in the stock market as a bastion of desirable
volatility persists. The Twentieth Century’s “efficient market hypothesis”
posited that stock market prices were “the best available estimates of the
real value of shares since the market has taken account of all available
information on an individual stock.”57 And tremendous market calamities
are met with some degree of well-publicized reform, rather than radical
shifts in the delivery of investment profits and losses.
Despite its age, omnipresence, and unique importance, the
American stock market defies macroeconomic action intended to stymie this
intolerable volatility.58 Perhaps because its prompts and controls thus
remain mystical, its effective (albeit rare) regulation is widely touted.
President Lyndon Baines Johnson openly lauded the work of the market’s
chief regulator in sustaining a period of national economic growth.59 Our
current President, curiously, extols the market’s heights while nonetheless

55

Roger Altman, Why the Economy Could…POP!, TIME, Aug. 12, 2013 (citing a rosy prediction on
economic growth from the Federal Reserve Board and a contemporaneous Bull Market as indicia of the
dramatic increase in jobs and incomes to come).
56
RICHARD D. WOLFF, CAPITALISM HITS THE FAN: THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC MELTDOWN AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 64 (2010).
57
JENNIFER BOTHAMLEY, DICTIONARY OF THEORIES 168 (1993).
58
See Ray C. Fair, Fed Policy and the Effects of a Stock Market Crash on the Economy: Is the Fed
Tightening too Little too Late?, BUS. ECON., Apr. 2000, at 7, http://fairmodel.econ.yale.edu/rayfair/pdf/
1999c.pdf (“[T]he Fed does not have the power to prevent a recession from taking place [when] there is a
crash.”).
59
JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 347 (3d ed. 2003) (relating President
Johnson’s crediting of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s “leadership and wisdom” for an
increase in total market value of New York Stock Exchange stocks from $23 billion in 1933 to $465
billion in 1964).
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warning that the accompanying data presents some cause for concern.60
All of which may simply support the most basic of aphorisms.
Greed predates exchanges. Investors desire some degree of volatility. And
exchanges shall experience devastating lows. As successful traders instruct
their squires, “[t]he market is never wrong in what it does; it just is.”61 The
surprise comes from a review of the responses to the most arresting of
market setbacks throughout history reveal a similarly detached (if not
confused) regard for cause and blame.
C. Largest Recent Mishaps
Indeed, nowhere was this testament to detached reform truer than in
the aftermath of the Great Depression. Eschewing the closing of the storied
NYSE,62 the committee of members governing the exchange decided—
literally within smoky, closed-door meetings—to continue trading in the
darkest hours of October 1929.63 What resulted from the Great Crash was
the codification of government surveillance of the exchanges. No longer the
sole masters of their domains, American exchanges would be forced to
answer to the newly-created SEC64 and to seek approval therefrom for all
substantive rule changes.65
The reactions to all subsequent American crashes, while often
legislative, have never again been so dramatic. The omnipresent, diverse
desire for higher returns coupled with the complex means thereto would
seem to cry for intervention from Congress or the Executive Branch. Yet,
quite the opposite has occurred. The market adjustments of the past twentyfive years evidence the growing gap between the regulators and the
regulated. While even the most cynical of popular authors has described the
recent stock market as “transparent [and] heavily policed,”66 cash is still
king. The competing exchanges, heavily dependent upon commission
revenue and the sale of market data (as opposed to exploring globalization
of access to trades or quotes), at times experiment with varied limits to
volatility and adopt the means of correcting prices and indices themselves

60
See Michael D. Shear & Jonathan Weisman, For the Administration, Another try to put the
Economy on Center Stage, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2013, at A11.
61
MARK DOUGLAS, THE DISCIPLINED TRADER: DEVELOPING WINNING ATTITUDES 37 (1990).
62
See GALBRAITH, supra note 43, at 118 (“The next day a further formula was hit upon. The
Exchange would stay open.”).
63
Id. at 117–18.
64
See STEVE FRASER, EVERY MAN A SPECULATOR: A HISTORY OF WALL STREET IN AMERICAN
LIFE 460 (2005) (“More fundamentally, it ended the Stock Exchange’s long reign of self-regulation,
placing all stock markets, at least in theory, under direct government supervision.”).
65
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2006) (a.k.a. “Self Regulatory Organizations,” or
“SROs”). For example, the Act requires that all substantive rule changes be submitted by the exchanges
for approval. Id.
66
MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE 61 (2010).
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while keeping the exchange open.67
More importantly, the data underlying the burst bubbles of 1987,
2000, and 2008 all belie the idyllic assertion that market volatility has been
tamed. Focus upon three of these embarrassing periods demonstrates that
the monster of momentary market myopia is stronger than ever.
1. The Intra-Week Crash of 1987
While many exchanges have adopted a purely cyberspace model,68
the NYSE remains at the vanguard of floor-based trading. Boasting
approximately 2,300 listings (cumulatively valued at over $20 trillion),69 the
most famed marketplace has nonetheless proven itself repeatedly susceptible
to disaster. Between the morning of October 19, 1987, and the closing bell
of October 20, 1987, the DJIA fell 25%. The fall was truly heard around the
world, as nineteen of twenty-three major markets concurrently fell 20% or
more.70
Shunning the drastic remedy of closing the exchanges (akin to
FDR’s “bank holiday” of March 1933 and prior executive-initiated market
halts),71 regulators responded by constraining trading.72 The SEC issued an
autopsy report on the 1987 Crash, containing mixed messages at best.
Specialists—the well-heeled entities that both match buyers with sellers and
operate as either to keep markets afloat—were said to have “in the
aggregate, performed satisfactorily.”73 Yet the SEC Report also admitted
that “a disturbing number of NYSE specialists on October 19th either were
net sellers or did not take substantial positions.”74 Eschewing soft targets
67
Brian Korn & Bryan Y.M. Tham, Why We Could Easily Have Another Flash Crash, FORBES
(Aug. 9, 2013, 7:58 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahljacobs/2013/08/09/why-we-could-easilyhave-another-flash-crash/ (describing unnamed stock exchanges that, at the time of the Flash Crash,
relied on “clearly erroneous” rules that only broke trades 60% or more away from the reference price).
68
See DAVID L. RATNER &THOMAS LEE HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
2–3 (5th ed. 1996).
69
Popper, supra note 22, at BU1 (auguring the purchase of the famed exchange by a private
entrepreneur at a price exceeding $8 billion).
70
DIDIER SORNETTE, WHY STOCK MARKETS CRASH 5–6 (2003) (remarking that American markets
were not the first or last to decline in October 1987, thus confounding attempts at identifying a sole
cause).
71
William L. Silber, Birth of the Federal Reserve: Crisis in the Womb 24–26 (NYU Stern Dep’t of
Fin. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. FIN-03-27, Oct. 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1299468 (arguing that the suspension of trading at the NYSE for four
months following the outbreak of World War I enabled President Wilson to both launch the Federal
Reserve and forestall an outflow of gold).
72
CHARLES GASPARINO, KING OF THE CLUB: RICHARD GRASSO AND THE SURVIVAL OF THE NEW
YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 58–61 (2007) (Gives the example of closing the direct order system between
the NYSE trading floor and its approximately 240 member firms, and details the Chairman’s private and
public efforts to keep the NYSE open for business despite pressure from its constituents and onlookers,
and noting “[a]ll orders would have to be done the old fashioned way: from trading desk to floor broker
to specialist.”).
73
DIV. OF MKT. REGULATION, SEC, FED. SEC. L. REPORT NO.1271, THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET
BREAK, at xvii (extra ed. Feb. 9, 1988) [hereinafter SEC Report].
74
Id.
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such as a sudden dearth of foreign investors or the role of derivatives, the
report took aim at exchange operational structures and their ability to handle
the unprecedented selling volume. Those structures were said to have
simply become overloaded in October 1987, as the average daily NYSE
trading volume of 175 million shares more than tripled, and automated
trading programs competed with retail order flow.75 Order imbalances—the
extent to which sellers outnumbered buyers—were attributed primarily to
institutional customers, which both clarified the mechanics of ordinary
order-routing on an exchange and dispelled the notion that the layman’s
panic precipitated the Crash.76 Two years later, the long-term remedy
crystallized in the form of crudely-fashioned “circuit breakers” that limited
trading halts to the most rare of market declines.77
To be sure, the SEC Report explained the October 1987 disaster and
updated the public on the workings of the exchanges. But the technicalities
attending larger concepts, like order flow and capacity, ensured that
remedies would need to be implemented by those exchanges themselves.
Faced with an unprecedented decline, a broad array of investors, and the
more immediate concern of accommodating dramatically increased volume,
the NYSE simply codified the practice it had quietly implemented during its
1987 crisis (i.e., delaying orders and imploring the membership to stop
sending computerized, program trades).78 In effect, a market that strove for
so long to impress upon the public its speed and transparency would—in
rare times of chaos—stop work and leave stock prices clouded.
Years later, the “dot coms” followed a rush to market of fledgling
technology companies and advances in access that allowed ordinary
households to trade stocks. But, in hindsight, the flurry was seen more as
folly than progress, and its consequences more humbling than debilitating.79
Much more instructive is the government’s reaction (or lack thereof) to the
foundering market that precipitated the present financial crisis.
2. The Five-Month Swoon of 2008-2009
The tale, and attendant numbers, of the nation’s most recent
economic nadir become no less harrowing through repetition. In sum, the
market listed stocks of giants that had simply wagered too much on exotic
vehicles dependent upon an over-inflated real estate market. In turn,
proprietary positions at financial firms became so linked to “collateralized
debt obligations” and similar products as to defy reason. The subsequent
75

Id. at 2-2.
Id. at xiii.
77
See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
78
See GASPARINO, supra note 72, at 59–61.
79
Gary A. Munneke, Maybe Mom and Dad Were Right: Musings on the Economic Downturn, 81
N.Y. ST. B.J. 10, 12 (2009) (“[I]n the early ‘90s we lost a little spare cash on a tech penny stock that
didn’t pan out.”).
76
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enormous rescue launched by the federal government itself spawned critics
fearing both the size of the bailouts and their economic and social utility.80
American markets fell substantially between the fall of 2008 and
winter of 2009, recovering in part by 2011 either because of or despite
government stimulus.81 The details of the monthly exodus of market
capitalization are listed below, via two major indices:82
MONTHLY
OPENING
9/1/08

DJIA

S&P 500

11,545

1,287

10/1/08

10,847

1,164

11/3/08

9,326

968

12/1/08

8,826

888

1/2/09

8,772

902

2/2/09

8,000

823

In sum, the DJIA fell approximately 31%, and the S&P Index
gradually fell approximately 37%. Neither decline triggered a circuit
breaker because no sizeable decline occurred within a single trading day.
Yet the indirect investor with interests in pension funds and college savings
plans, which adjust holdings at a glacial rate, watched helplessly as fund
value ebbed away. But tales of bureaucratic “mis-decision,” evaporated
savings, and involuntarily-extended working careers were quickly replaced
in the spring of 2010 by a new breed of market disaster that posed the risk of
fatal declines to prices in minutes.
3. The Flash Crash of 2010
On May 6, 2010, the DJIA inexplicably fell almost 1,000 points in
less than half an hour, with losses spanning several markets.83 The index
thus “experienced its second largest point swing in its 114-year history,”84
80
See generally J. Scott Colesanti, Laws, Sausages, and Bailouts: Testing the Populist View of the
Causes of the Economic Crisis, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 175, 182–219 (2010).
81
See, e.g., Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 115(a), 122
Stat. 3765 (2008) (authorizing, via the Troubled Asset Relief Program, over $700 billion in “bailout”
monies to troubled companies).
82
Dow Jones Industrial Average Historical Prices, YAHOO FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/q/
hp?s=%5EDJI&a=08&b=1&c=2008&d=01&e=2&f=2009&g=m (last visited Feb. 24, 2014); S&P 500
Historical Prices, YAHOO FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EGSPC&a=08&b=1&c=2008&d=
01&e=2&f=2009&g=m (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
83
HAL S. SCOTT & ANNA GELPERN, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND
REGULATION 904 (19th ed. 2012).
84
Id. at 905.
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temporarily extinguishing approximately $1 trillion in market value.85 The
intra-day debacle briefly reduced some stock prices to a penny.86 Volumes
of trades were later canceled, and prices rebounded,87 but the Armageddonlike quality of the disaster did not escape either humorists88 or the popular
press.89
The twenty-minute plunge was attributed by popular sources to a
combination of systemic glitches and human “panic-selling.”90 The ensuing
SEC study added that a sole seller of $4.1 billion of a particular type of
futures contract prompted copycat, high-frequency trading.91 The dollars
were replaced and the regulators pacified, and the industry took not to
expand its study of volatility expanded to acknowledge the risks for disaster
inherent in software trading programs. Again, the responsibility for
implementing measures to relieve new market angst was eschewed by the
government and entrusted to the exchanges themselves. Study of those
protections reveals a protocol surprisingly simplistic.
III. EXISTING RULES
Paradoxically, as the stock market’s breadth and speed trend

85
Stevenson Jacobs, Traders Put Faith in “Circuit Breakers” After Dive, SEATTLE TIMES (May 19,
2010, 2:43 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/2011905964_apusmarketplungesec.
html.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
See, e.g., STEPHEN COLBERT, AMERICA AGAIN: RE-BECOMING THE GREATNESS WE NEVER
WEREN’T 84 (2012) (“Computers do most of the actual [stock exchange] trading. And thank goodness
they do. Because computers allow us to make tens of thousands of trades per second—precious seconds
we otherwise would have wasted wondering if we’d really meant to push ‘enter’ instead of ‘delete.’”).
89
See Jacobs, supra note 85. The term “flash crash” was repeated—and its attendant fear
reinforced—on August 1, 2012 when a “technical glitch” misquoted scores of stocks at a firm called
Knight Capital, causing losses exceeding $440 million. See Korn & Tham, supra note 67.
90
See Sal Arnuk et al., Comment: “Algo bots” Could Cause Another Flash Crash, FIN. TIMES (May
5, 2011, 9:39 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6d9fc8c8-70a5-11e0-9b1d-00144feabdc0.html
(“[H]igh frequency traders . . . tripped over each other to see who could sell the fastest.”); Peter Cohan,
The 2010 Flash Crash: What Caused It and How to Prevent the Next One, DAILY FIN. (Aug. 18, 2010,
8:20 PM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/08/18/the-2010-flash-crash-what-caused-it-and-how-toprevent-the-next/ (attributing the unprecedented single-day market decline to market fragmentation). But
see SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 83, at 904 (“No evidence so far has suggested that this market event
was caused by hacking, terrorist activity, or ‘fat finger’ errors.”); Peter J. Henning, The Flash Crash and
Possible Enforcement Actions, DEALBOOK (May 24, 2010, 11:22 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2010/05/24/the-flash-crash-and-possible-enforcement-actions/ (“The Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission are still trying to figure out what caused
the flash crash on May 6.”).
91
REPORT OF THE STAFFS OF THE CFTC AND SEC TO THE JOINT ADVISORY COMM. ON EMERGING
REGULATORY ISSUES, FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010 2–3 (Sept. 30, 2010)
(describing the SEC and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) Study and findings
regarding the market events of May 6, 2010). As late as August 2013, the specter of future “flash
crashes” remained relevant. See Nathaniel Popper, Pricing Problems Suspends Nasdaq Trading for Three
Hours, DEALBOOK (Aug. 22, 2013, 12:52 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/nasdaq-markethalts-trading/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (“The United States stock market showed again on
Thursday that it remained vulnerable to technological breakdowns even as regulators and market
operators work to keep up with trading that is increasingly electronic and driven by speed.”).
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towards incomprehension,92 the mechanisms safeguarding investments
remain arcane. Indeed, twenty-five years after the October 1987 decline that
extinguished 25% of the market, the chief tool to combat hazardous
volatility across a market is still the circuit breaker, an electronic brake only
slightly more refined than the proverbial shoe stuck in the factory
machinery.
A. Market-Wide Circuit Breakers
Implemented in the largest domestic stock exchanges in 1989,
circuit breakers amount to forcibly slowing systems perennially and loudly
touted as being quick and efficient. For better or worse, for decades these
checks became the chief industry response to a market that occasionally fell
too far too fast. Emblematic is NYSE Rule 80B, which from its inception in
1989 until 2012 read as follows:
Rule 80B. Trading Halts Due to Extraordinary Market
Volatility
(a) Trading in stocks shall halt on the Exchange and shall
not reopen for the time periods described in this paragraph
(a) if the Dow Jones Industrial Average reaches Level 1
below its closing value on the previous trading day:
(i) before 2:00 p.m. Eastern time, for one hour;
(ii) at or after 2:00 p.m. but before 2:30 p.m.
Eastern time, for 30 minutes.
If the Dow Jones Industrial Average reaches Level 1 below
its closing value on the previous trading day at or after 2:30
p.m. Eastern time, trading shall continue on the Exchange
until the close, unless the Dow Jones Industrial Average
reaches Level 2 below its closing value on the previous
trading day, at which time trading shall be halted for the
remainder of the day.
(b) Trading in stocks shall halt on the Exchange and shall
not reopen for the time periods described in this paragraph
(b) if the Dow Jones Industrial Average reaches Level 2
below its closing value on the previous trading day:
(i) before 1:00 p.m. Eastern time, for two hours;
92
Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner, SEC, Speech at Compliance Week 2010: Market Upheaval and
Investor
Harm
Should
not
be
the
New
Normal
(May
24,
2010),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch052410laa-1.htm (Denounced the Flash Crash of May 2010
as a “breakdown” serving as one of the “further stark reminders of the dangers of weak oversight of our
tightly interconnected financial markets.”).
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(ii) at or after 1:00 p.m. but before 2:00 p.m.
Eastern time, for one hour;
(iii) at or after 2:00 p.m. Eastern time, for the
remainder of the day.
(c) If the Dow Jones Industrial Average reaches Level 3
below its closing value on the previous trading day, trading
in stocks shall halt on the Exchange and shall not reopen for
the remainder of the day.93
Thus, the cure for “extraordinary volatility” is a cooling off period,
the length of which is limited to three options. The pivotal notions are the
trigger points (a.k.a. “Levels”), which were originally set to finite measures
and adjusted (belatedly) to a percentage scale nine years after inception (i.e.,
1998). The original miscue in calibration relegated the device to almost
complete disuse: the only triggering of the Market-Wide Circuit Breaker
between 1989 and 1998 was in 1997, when trading was halted twice in
response to plummeting markets in the Far East.94 The dated trigger points,
their infrequent adjustment, and the short, one-day nature of the reference
points were blamed for the tool’s infrequent implementation. This suggests
that, at best, the breaker’s value lies much more in a psychological barrier to
continued institutional selling than to a halt to widespread market panic. In
a word, Market-Wide Circuit Breakers serve as minefields that savvy
professionals and their computerized trading programs seem adept at
negotiating.95
In more recent times, the Market-Wide Circuit Breaker “Levels”
are, at least theoretically, more likely to be triggered. The superficially
broader S&P 500 Index is utilized as a reference point, and the trigger levels
have been lowered. Since April 201396 the more finely tuned NYSE rule
now reads in relevant part as follows:
(i) For purposes of this Rule, a Market Decline means a
decline in price of the S&P 500® Index between 9:30 a.m.
and 4:00 p.m. on a trading day as compared to the closing
price of the S&P 500® Index for the immediately preceding
trading day. The Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 Market
Declines that will be applicable for the trading day will be
93
NYSE Circuit Breakers (Rule 80B), PLI’S IN BRIEF (Oct. 22, 2008), http://inbrief.pli.edu/2008/
10/nyse-circuit-breakers-rule-80b.html.
94
See generally SEC Approves “Limit Up-Limit Down” Plan and Tighter Circuit Breakers, DAVIS
POLK & WARDWELL (June 6, 2012), http://www.davispolk.com/download.php?file=sites/default/files/
files/Publication/f79a3977-9354-4922-98f1-014d57ea0f40/Preview/PublicationAttachment/1668d75ebc8b-4e9b-a8b4-02df28eae3d6/060612_SRO_Proposal.html.
95
See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
96
Press Release, NYSE, NYSE Announces Second-Quarter 2013 Circuit-Breaker Levels (Mar. 28,
2013), http://www.nyse.com/press/1364465929027.html.
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publicly disseminated before 9:30 a.m.
(ii) A "Level 1 Market Decline" means a Market Decline of
7%.
(iii) A "Level 2 Market Decline" means a Market Decline of
13%.
(iv) A "Level 3 Market Decline" means a Market Decline of
20%.97
The updated Market-Wide Circuit Breaker provides that
thresholds—now lowered to 7%, 13%, and 20%, respectively—would be
recalculated daily (as opposed to quarterly). In a tacit bow to market speed,
the halt triggered by a Level 1 or Level 2 decline has been shortened to 15
minutes, while a Level 3 breaker would halt the market for the remainder of
the trading day.98 The NASDAQ counterpart provision ensures that the
cyber-market will honor a market shutdown pursuant to NYSE Rule 80B.99
B. Other People’s Concerns
Commenters have long noted that the automated practice of
curtailing exchange trading “short cuts” individual investors.100 Noteworthy
is the public feedback that the SEC received in the form of Comment Letters
submitted in response to the expanded Market-Wide Circuit Breaker levels
when proposed in 2011.101 While neither objectively voluminous nor
decidedly one-sided, these Comments did evidence the public’s mistrust of
the faith that the Commission places on circuit breakers in general.
One individual investor wrote, “if a stock comes off a halt, and
brokers of the retail owners do not allow trading in the first several minutes,
those traders who have near-instant access to the market get to set the price.
. . . [O]ften to the detriment of the stockholders.”102 The same commenter
provided a practical solution when she added, “all trading pauses should
specify a time to resume. [S]uch information could be sent as a news item
97
NYSE Rule 80B(a) (2013), http://nyserules.nyse.com/NYSETools/PlatformViewer.asp?searched
=1&selectednode=chp_1_3_4_20&CiRestriction=80B&manual=%2Fnyse%2Frules%2Fnyse-rules%2F.
98
See id. at 80B(b)(i)–(ii).
99
See Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Rule 6121 (2013), http://finra.complinet.
com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=14651&element_id=7182&highlight=6121#r14651
(Provides for a trading halt “if other major securities markets initiate market-wide trading halts . . . .”).
100
See Chedley A. Aouriri et al., Exchanges – Circuit Breakers, Curbs, and Other Trading
Restrictions, INVESTMENTFAQ (Oct. 6, 2008), http://invest-faq.com/articles/exch-circuit-brkr.html (“The
circuit breakers cut off the automated program trading initiated by the big brokerage houses . . . . This
automated connection allows them to short-cut the individual investors who must go thr[ough] the
brokers and specialists on the stock exchange.”).
101
See Comments on FINRA Rulemaking, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-finra-2011-054/
finra2011054.shtml. (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
102
Suzanne H. Shatto, Comment to Comments on FINRA Rulemaking, SEC (Oct. 20, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-finra-2011-054/finra2011054-1.htm.
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on common newswires.”103
Meanwhile, a government official publicly disclosed his “strong
reservations”104 that the Market-Wide Circuit Breakers—even in their
modified states—had yet to reach after-hours trading.105 Concurrently, the
CEO of a derivatives marketplace expressed concern that the proposed
Market-Wide Circuit Breakers (when operating in conjunction with other
proposed breakers)106 “would serve to exacerbate rather than remediate
conditions of extraordinary volatility.”107 Separately, the managing director
of a firm dedicated to providing “mathematical market intelligence on
trading behaviors”108 submitted commentary in opposition to the breakers
that was far more pointed, if not more colorful:
By stamping out natural cleansing mechanisms, forests were
subjected to monumental and unnatural risk, producing
catastrophic fires and sweeping beetle infestations.
In similar fashion, trading markets cannot heal
themselves. And public companies derive no benefit from a
synthetic environment that forces value money out and
remands price-setting authority to transient intraday
intermediaries.109
One Wall Street firm optimistically opined that the new MarketWide Circuit Breaker would have been triggered on 13 occasions since 1962
(as opposed to the one time it was actually triggered in 1997).110 Lastly, one
commenter from academia took issue with the obsolete size of the first level
of Market-Wide Circuit Breaker (i.e., 7%) and the lack of any trading halt in
the presence of numerous questionable trades and/or “serious discrepancies
in the data submitted by the major trading platforms.”111 Conversely, the
voice of Wall Street’s largest securities firms supported the Market-Wide
Circuit Breakers and described the SEC proposal as “yet another important
103
Id. It bears noting that, for different disclosures, the SEC has blessed use of various methods of
achieving “public disclosure.” 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(e) (2013); see Regulation FD (“Full Disclosure”), id.
at §§ 240.100-101(e) (acknowledging methods “reasonably designed to provide broad, non-exclusionary
distribution of the information to the public” as a cure for inadvertent disclosure of “material nonpublic
information”). Id. at § 101(e).
104
Bart Chilton, Comment to Comments on FINRA Rulemaking, SEC (Oct. 25, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-finra-2011-054/finra2011054-4.pdf.
105
“After-Hours Trading” connotes limited sessions of decreased trading volume. These sessions are
offered in different forms by various exchanges as the global market glacially moves toward the day
when all markets are open 24 hours a day.
106
See infra notes 110–114 and accompanying text.
107
Craig S. Donohue, Comment to Comments on FINRA Rulemaking, SEC (Jan. 25, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-bats-2011-038/bats2011038-6.pdf.
108
Timothy Quast, Comment to Comments on FINRA Rulemaking, SEC (Jan. 20, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-bats-2011-038/bats2011038-5.pdf.
109
Id.
110
SEC Approves “Limit Up-Limit Down” Plan and Tighter Circuit Breakers, supra note 94.
111
James J. Angel, Comment to Comments on FINRA Rulemaking, SEC (Oct. 25, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-bats-2011-038/bats2011038-2.pdf.
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step toward addressing extraordinary market volatility.”112
As Mark Twain penned, “[h]istory shows that the Moral Sense
enables us to perceive morality and how to avoid it . . . .”113 Likewise,
Market-Wide Circuit Breakers serve to remind us of the borders to
unacceptable volatility, and how best to stop short of them.114 As has been
aptly noted, the breakers failed to “kick in” during a week in October 2008
in which the DJIA lost over 1,000 points, or on any of the alarmingly
volatile trading days that commenced our present era of market malaise.115
Indeed, Market-Wide Circuit Breakers are alarmingly mislabeled; the
mechanism is specific to each exchange and not directly linked to other
exchanges.116 The breakers—wholly fragmented and subjected to varying
warning levels—are still irrelevant to Bull Markets, as they only trigger
upon the reference point’s descent. A gradual, devastating descent remains
either beyond concern or control, for, even with the lowered thresholds,117
the Market-Wide Circuit Breakers would not have been triggered once
during the Swoon of 2008-2009.118
C. The Limit Up-Limit Down Breaker
In June 2010, in response to the largely inexplicable stock exchange
disaster of the prior month (i.e., the Flash Crash), the SEC and the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), the nation’s largest private
regulator, implemented on a pilot basis five-minute trading halts in
securities that fluctuated wildly within a five-minute window.119 The halts
were to be triggered by a 10% rise or fall of an individual stock’s price.120
In June 2011, the universe of subject stocks in this pilot program
was expanded from those comprising the S&P 500 Index to all domestic
listings.121 Of perhaps greater consequence, the SEC found that the pilot
halts were too often erroneously triggered by trading errors – an observation
that can only be considered ironic in light of the fact that “fat fingers” were
112

Ann L. Vlcek, Comment to Comments on FINRA Rulemaking, SEC (Feb. 7, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-bats-2011-038/bats2011038-7.pdf (The SIFMA letter supported halts as
enabling unspecified “market participants” to “appropriately adjust their buying and selling interest”).
113
WILLIAM E. PHIPPS, MARK TWAIN’S RELIGION 281 (2003).
114
Jacobs, supra note 85.
115
See id. But see SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 83 at 904 (noting that related “collars” on program
trading were triggered in 2007 “in connection with the subprime crisis”).
116
Jacobs, supra note 85.
117
Press Release, NYSE, NYSE Announces Second Quarter 2013 Circuit-Breaker Levels, (Mar. 28,
2013), http://www.nyse.com/press/1364465929027.html (noting the latest NYSE Market-Wide Circuit
Breakers are set to triggers of 1,450 point, 2,900 point and 4,350 point drops in the DJIA; and that on
April 8, 2013, the Breakers became tied to the S&P index).
118
See Korn & Tham, supra note 67 (noting the lowered 7% threshold would have resulted in a
Market-Wide Circuit Breaker being triggered during the Flash Crash of May 2010).
119
See generally Self-Regulatory Organizations, SEC Release No. 34-67090, 103 S.E.C. Docket
2574, 2012 WL 1963372 (May 31, 2012).
120
Id. at *3, *6.
121
Id. at *4.
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publicly blamed for the seminal Flash Crash a year before.122 In May 2012,
the SEC adopted as final the “Limit Up-Limit Down” breaker (“LULD”) to
address market volatility. The measure, triggered by large, sudden price
moves, prevents trades in individual securities. Contemporaneously, the
Commission approved modifications to the Market-Wide Circuit Breakers
of 1989.123
Consequentially, effective February 4, 2013, the modified LULD
protocol required the following:
•

A new “limit up-limit down” trading halt would prevent trades in
individual securities from occurring outside of a specified price
band. The mechanism would first be applied to DJIA stocks and
later to all S&P 500 stocks.

•

The mechanism would be triggered by trades outside of a “price
band” set at a percentage level above and below the average price of
the stock over the immediately preceding five-minute trading
period. These price bands would be 5%, 10%, 20% as set by the
stock’s closing price the day before.

•

These price bands would double during the opening and closing
periods of the trading day (i.e., less strictly gauging volatility during
periods normally characterized by heavy trading volume).

•

If the stock’s price did not naturally move back within the price
bands within 15 seconds, there would be a five-minute trading
pause.124

The new measures125 were made subject to a one-year pilot period
(through February 2014), during which time the breakers would be
expanded to fill the entire trading day and the SEC would receive
comments.126 Curiously, it was observed that the LULD plan had been
122

Eric Rosenbaum, Latest Flash Crash a Fat Five-Fingered Slap to Investors, THE STREET (Oct. 1,
2010), http://www.thestreet.com/story/10876622/1/.
123
See Quast, supra note 108.
124
See Investor Bulletin, SEC, New Measures to Address Market Volatility (Apr. 9, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/circuitbreakersbulletin.htm.
125
See NYSE Rule 612 (2013), http://nyserules.nyse.com/NYSETools/PlatformViewer.asp?searched
=1&selectednode=chp%5F1%5F9%5F1%5F14&CiRestriction=612&manual=%2Fnyse%2Frules%2Fny
se%2Drules%2F; FINRA Rule 6121.01, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid
=2403&element_id=7182 (codifying the LULD Breakers at the respective Stock Exchanges); see also
FINRA Rule 11892 (2013), http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&
element_id=8854.
126
See Annette L. Nazareth, “Limit Up-Limit Down” Plan and Circuit Breakers Approved,
HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 13, 2013, 9:15 AM), http://blogs.law.
harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/06/13/limit-up-limit-down-plan-and-circuit-breakers-approved/.
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modified to “prevent an erroneous trade from triggering a trade pause.”127
Recall that an erroneous trade was the majority theory as to the culprit for
the original Flash Crash of May 2010.128
D. Other People’s Fears
As commenters to the SEC rule proposal pointed out, the “price
bands” are difficult to calculate and inordinately challenging to apply.129
Further, the SEC refused to heed the suggestion that the presence of
numerous stocks subject to the limits should prompt a market-wide
shutdown.130
To be sure, a plethora of evidence exists of dangerously uninformed
repair; observers still cannot agree on the cause of the Flash Crash.131 Not
surprisingly, few can pinpoint the goal of the cure. The final LULD breaker
makes no mention of recurrence, nor exhibits any concern for spikes in
volume. Likewise, while the information gathered and displayed is detailed,
it fails to convey the effect that any halt has on a stock’s price.132 As a
result, the LULD breaker—a daily occurrence on the major exchanges—
results foremost in an accumulation of data so stock-specific (and, yet,
obtuse) as to belie any meaningful conveyance of cause for market alarm or
portfolio adjustment; to the untrained eye, a random sampling of stock
prices simply re-set. It is doubtful that such routine data affects decisionmaking by those effecting long-term investment strategies.133 Of course, the
breakers, five-minutes in duration, may temporarily slow a stock’s intra-day
descent due to panic selling by nervous professionals, but are of no use to
127

SEC Approves “Limit Up-Limit Down” Plan and Tighter Circuit Breakers, supra note 94.
See Cohan, supra note 90.
129
See SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 119, at n.24 (citing CME Group Letters I
and II and Commissioner Chilton Letter).
130
Id. at 7 & n.22.
131
See Jacobs, supra note 85 (Identifies panic selling as “one of several possible causes of the May 6
plunge” and describing the need to give “investors a break during extreme market dips” to avoid “a chain
reaction of human and computerized selling”).
132
See generally Trading Halts Code, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/Trader.aspx?id=
TradeHaltCodes (last visited Feb. 24, 2014); Trading Halt Search, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaqtrader.
com/Trader.aspx?id=TradingHaltSearch (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). Between August 2, 2013, and
August 12, 2013, an average of approximately 7 single-stock halts per day appeared on the
nasdaqtrader.com site. Id. (input each date in the “Halt Start Date” then search). A sample website
display resulting from the LULD halt appears below:
128

Halt
Date

Halt
Time

Issue
Issue Name Market
Symbol

8/12/13 10:37:14 CNYD

CHINA NASDAQ
YIDA
HOLDING,
CO

Id.

Pause
ResumpReason
ResumpResumption
Threshold
tion Quote
Code
tion Date
Trade Time
Price
Time
T7

7.7870

8/12/13 10:37:14

10:42:14

133
Practitioners have been quick to criticize the LULD breakers. See, e.g., Korn & Tham, supra note
67 (“Despite all these efforts, not much has changed. . . . [LULD Breakers] at best, . . . will limit the
effect of a flash crash – not prevent it.”).
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the prevention of a market swoon.
In essence, the SEC blessed the attempts of NASDAQ, a large
exchange, to provide intra-day information on a website that might quell a
storm of panic selling by professional traders – an undesirable activity
linked, in part, to the Flash Crash. It is questionable whether such reform
will meet even that modest goal. But in approving the LULD protocol, the
SEC has exhibited a seismic shift towards rationality. Specifically, business
models that prosper from Bull Markets have seen the need to curtail trading
both when stocks fall sharply and rise just as quickly. Notably, this need to
curb upwards volatility was highlighted by an academic years ago.134
Overall, the continuing hazards posed by stock exchange selfregulation of volatility—i.e., remedies that have been superficial and
belated—can be linked to clear tendencies. And the central government’s
heavy hand, so omnipresent throughout stock exchange history,135 is
completely absent from the recent trend of trusting exchanges to create and
calibrate their own brakes.
Stated otherwise, on matters of permissible volatility, the SEC has
deferred greatly to the exchanges136 who, though private, for-profit
entities,137 nonetheless readily accept the light touch of SEC supervision.138
The combination of these facts has led to the precarious present position
that, while Congress and the White House sit on the sidelines, exchanges at
once steering economies towards long-term recovery and dependent upon
daily trading revenue decide when to cease and when to resume trading.139
The hazard posed by this self-interest is highlighted by the clear
examples of industry de-regulation during the boom and bust times of the
last decade.
134
Tamar Frankel, What Can Be Done About Stock Market Volatility?, 69 B.U. L. REV. 991, 996
(1989) (decrying trading halts that address “only down-trends” and noting that “up-trends” are equally
capable of producing “bubbles” and runs on the market).
135
See supra pp. 7–8.
136
See, e.g., Opulent Fund, L.P. v. NASDAQ Stock Mkt., Inc., No. C-07-03683 RMW, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 79260, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2007) (quoting Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers,
Inc., 500 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir. 2007)) (“[A]s a private corporation, NASDAQ may engage in a
variety of non-governmental activities that serve its private business interests, such as its efforts to
increase trading volume.”).
137
See Joe Mont, SIFMA Challenges Regulatory Role of Stock Exchanges, COMPLIANCE WEEK
(Aug. 6, 2013) (noting the industry voice’s faulting the conflict of interest posed by “for-profit” stock
exchanges fulfilling statutory duties of self regulation).
138
See Overview, NATIONAL STOCK EXCHANGE: REGULATION, http://www.nsx.com/content/
regulation (last visited Feb. 24, 2014) (“The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulates the
National Stock Exchange, similar to all other exchanges.”).
139
In the Spring of 2013, the SEC opened for comment a proposal that would condense and codify
Commission requirements of stock exchanges regarding the testing of their automated systems
(“Regulation SCI”). The proposal does not set standards for market halts or breakers and largely
reiterates the delegation of authority to the individual market centers in this regard. See Regulatory
Systems Compliance and Integrity, SEC Release No. 34-69077 (March 8, 2013), available at
www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2013/34-69077.pdf.
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1. 2004 Net Capital Ruling
Since 1965, SEC Rule 15c3-1 (“the Net Capital Rule”) has been in
The Rule serves at least three purposes: (1) avoidance of
force.
dependence on customer funds; (2) efficient operation of markets; and (3)
deterrence to violative conduct.141 The Rule is generally perceived as
establishing “early warning thresholds.”142 Concurrently, even errors in (or
omissions of) requisite calculations are disciplinable.143
140

It is now axiomatic that the SEC erred when, in April 2004, it
privately agreed to a relaxation of the Net Capital Rule in favor of the
The agreement, to which all five SEC
largest broker-dealers.144
Commissioners acquiesced, permitted the nation’s largest financial service
firms to legally “upstream” funds to their Bank Holding Companies, thus
freeing up millions in funds for purchase of investments.145 The ugly
compromise received far-reaching attention in the years since, even inviting
scrutiny from such off-topic popular periodicals as Rolling Stone
Magazine.146
It was thus no coincidence that the largest financial firms came to
the SEC seeking relief from the strict and ubiquitous Net Capital Rule
before feeling comfortable with the now notorious rush to unprecedented
leveraging.147 The SEC expressly responded, via a formal rule interpretation
allowing certain broker-dealers to utilize a “voluntary, alternative method of
computing deductions to net capital. . . .”148 In return, this short list of firms
140

17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2013).
See SEC, Net Capital Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 40,395, 40,396 (Oct. 2, 1989) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 240) (“Finally, if the liability of a broker-dealer to its customers from violations of state and
federal law is to be a deterrent to improper conduct, a firm should be required to maintain a reasonable
financial stake in its business.”).
142
See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATIONS, 666–67 (11th ed.
2009).
143
See Direct Brokerage, Inc., Exchange Hearing Panel Decision No. 05-171, 2006 WL 2918766, at
*1 (Sept. 12, 2006) (Found violations of both SEC “Rule 15c3-1 thereunder and NYSE Rule 325 by
failing to maintain [firm] net capital at required levels and failing to compute net capital as required”).
144
Kevin Drawbaugh, US SEC Clears New Net-Capital Rules for Brokerages, REUTERS (Apr. 28,
2004), excerpted by SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE, STANFORD L. SCH., http://archive.
is/Pp6i (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
145
See Stephen Labaton, Agency’s ’04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, and Risk, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 3, 2008, at A1 (discussing the exemption codified in Alternative Net Capital Requirements for
Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consolidated Supervised Entities, Exchange Act Release No. 49,830, 69
Fed. Reg. 34,428, 34,428 (June 21, 2004)); see also WILLIAM D. COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS: A TALE OF
HUBRIS AND WRETCHED EXCESS ON WALL STREET 531 (2009) (referencing the June 2004 changes to net
capital rules that permitted “securities firms to increase the amount of leverage they could use on their
balance sheets to forty times equity while traditional banks, by statute, had to keep the leverage closer to
ten times equity”).
146
See generally Matt Taibbi, Wall Street’s Naked Swindle, ROLLING STONE, Oct. 15, 2009; see also
Julie Satow, Ex-SEC Official Blames Agency for Blow-Up of Broker-Dealers, N.Y. SUN, Sept. 18, 2008,
at B1 (discussing the collapse of Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, and Merrill Lynch).
147
See COFFEE & SALE, supra note 142, at 66667.
148
SEC, Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consolidated
Supervised Entities, 69 Fed.Reg. 34,428, 34,428 (June 21, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200 and
240).
141
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agreed to a heightened internal alarms system and to subject its holding
company and affiliates to “group-wide Commission supervision” termed
consolidated entity supervision.149
Consolidated entity supervision was, by all accounts, a disaster.150
With the express blessing of their most immediate regulator, the largest
broker-dealers facilitated leveraging at the parent company level that would
reach Biblical proportions.151 Both the ensuing blurred ledgers and billions
in trading losses were unprecedented. Perhaps predictably, this success in
weakening regulation of monies to be used for trading spread to the rules
governing where the monies would be traded.
2. Rescission of NYSE Rule 97
To be sure, the latter half of 2008 evidenced quick revisions to
regulatory rules. Parent companies of struggling brokerage firms were
transformed overnight into bank holding companies for the purpose of
opening windows to federal reserve loans.152 In September and October
2008, the SEC even took the dramatic step of temporarily banning shortselling to shield the stock of a select list of financial service providers.153
However, just a few months earlier in 2008, a spirit of haughtiness
still permeated the securities industry. Between December 2005 and
December 2007, the DJIA had grown twenty-one out of twenty-five
months.154 The Bull Market’s growth had been so unstinting that a noted
Professor at the University of Chicago believed that the “central problem of
depression-prevention has been solved, for all practical purposes.”155
Amidst the economic euphoria, the NYSE requested and received
permission from the SEC to eliminate an anti-fraud prohibition that had
been a part of its rulebook for decades.
149

Id.
See Labaton, supra note 145 (discussing the exemption codified in Alternative Net Capital
Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consolidated Supervised Entities, supra note 148).
151
See CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN: EASY MONEY, HIGH ROLLERS,
AND THE GREAT CREDIT CRASH 84 (2008) (describing “extreme leveraging in the financial sector” that
led to institutional and market ruin in October 2008).
152
See Bank of America in Talks to Acquire Merrill Lynch, DEALBOOK (Sept. 14, 2008, 4:22 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/09/14/bank-of-america-in-talks-to-buy-merrill-lynch/?_r=0
(noting
that the “shotgun marriage” between failing Bear Stearns and JPMorgan Chase earlier in the year, a deal
made possible by the Treasury Department guaranteeing $29 billion in troubled assets).
153
Press Release, SEC, Statement Concerning Short Selling and Issuer Stock Repurchases (Oct. 1,
2008), www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-235.htm (prohibiting, on a temporary basis, short selling in
delineated financial companies); see also Order Extending Emergency Order Pursuant to Section
12(K)(2), Exchange Act Release No. 58723, 94 S.E.C. Docket 818, 2008 WL 4444067 (Oct. 2, 2008).
154
See Dow Jones Industrial Average, YAHOO FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/echarts?s=%5EDJI
+Interactive#symbol=%5Edji;range=20051128,20071130;compare=;indicator=volume;charttype=area;cr
osshair=on;ohlcvalues=0;logscale=off;source=undefined (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
155
PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008 9 (2009)
(quoting Robert Lucas, Presidential Address at the 115th Annual Meeting of the American Economic
Association (Jan. 4, 2003), http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~dbackus/Taxes/Lucas%20priorities%20AER
%2003.pdf.
150

Published by eCommons, 2013

26

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1

Specifically, NYSE Rule 97 (“Limitation on Members’ Trading
Because of Block Positioning”) prohibited all trades in the last half-hour of
the trading day on a “plus tick” –i.e., a price higher than the last sale – when
a firm had acquired a block position in the same stock earlier in the day.156
The logic was simple: traders are inclined to bid a stock’s price up, an
anomaly made possible by the world valuing a stock based on its last trade
of the day, when in possession of a block of the stock. Rule 97 was
aggressively enforced by the NYSE as one of many measures to combat
stock manipulation through exchange trading.157 But giddy with a market
that had risen for so long, the NYSE proposed in February 2008 to drop
Rule 97 from its arsenal.158 Less than forty days later the Rule was
unceremoniously removed,159 a move that received scant attention,160 and
the stock market became a bit more volatile as each trading day ended.
3. Removal of the “Uptick Rule”161
Likewise, in July 2007, the SEC abolished the rule that had cabined
short selling since the aftermath of the Depression.162 For decades, the
“uptick rule” had prevented successive short selling on the stock exchanges,
thus preventing a party (or parties) from conspiring to pit a company’s share
price by repeatedly buying its shares at lower prices. Yet the SEC
acquiesced to the position that the market had grown robust enough to
withstand this form of chicanery, and concluded in the relevant release that
the uptick rule constituted “restrictions where they no longer appear
156
NYSE Information Memo No. 02-56, Rule 97 – Limitation of Members’ Trading Because of
Block Positioning (Dec. 2, 2002), http://www.nyse.com/nysenotices/nyse/rule-changes/detail?memo_
id=02-56.
157
See, e.g., Thomas Andrew Wallace, Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 94-132, 1994 WL 721681,
at *6 (Oct. 31, 1994). The panel found a registered representative of a brokerage to have caused a
violation of Rule 97 by effecting a trade “for the purpose of improperly influencing the price of [a]
security.” Id. at *1. The author of this article, former Trial Counsel for the N.Y.S.E., served as one of the
attorneys representing the N.Y.S.E. Division of Enforcement in this case. Id.
158
See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-57236, 92 S.E.C. Docket 1418,
2008 WL 426154, at *1 (Jan. 30, 2008). The panel stated “the Exchange believes that, in active and
volatile market conditions, incremental movements of a penny or more occur almost instantaneously,
lessening the ability to influence the closing price of a security.” Id. at *2.
159
See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-57455, 92 S.E.C. Docket 2452,
2008 WL 762940, at *2–3 (Mar. 7, 2008) (“The Commission notes that other venues are available for
market participants to effect block position transactions without the restrictions currently imposed by
NYSE Rule 97.”).
160
See Ann L. Vlcek, Comment to Proposed Rule Changes to Rescind Rule 97, SEC (Feb. 27, 2008),
http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=272. Only one comment was received by the SEC on the Rule
97 rescission proposal. The Securities and Industry Financial Markets Association (“SIFMA”) stated
that it “fully” supported the rescission. Id.
161
Formerly 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(c) (2000) (repealed 2007).
162
Opinions on the significance of the uptick rule’s rescission vary greatly. Compare Jeff Benjamin,
Did Repeal of the Uptick Rule Unleash Market Havoc?, INVESTMENTNEWS.COM (Sept. 10, 2007, 9:21
AM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20070910/FREE/70910009 (referencing the “fingerpointing exercise that assigns much of the blame to an obscure rule change”), with Barbara L. Minton,
Repeal of the Uptick Rule: A Planned Program to Obliterate the Stock Market,” NATURALNEWS.COM
(Dec. 5, 2008), http://www.naturalnews.com/025003.html.
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effective or necessary.”163 Clearly, the restriction was still necessary. After
the rule was abolished, short selling grew exponentially, and is labeled as
one of the accelerants (if not causes) of the Crisis.164
In sum, the most recent sustained Bull Market amply demonstrates
that left to its own devices, the stock exchange deregulates in favor of more
voluminous trading. It seems clear, then, that stock exchanges should not be
left to their own devices. To that end, it is suggested that four changes are
warranted. These changes would both expand upon the knowledge gleaned
from the latest market downturn, and more equitably preserve the market
gains from the ensuing recovery. The proposed changes would both
reintegrate the federal government into day-to-day regulation of the
exchanges and also animate the clear, prescient observations of those who
have filed public comments to germane SEC rule filings. The changes
advocated herein essentially seek more mechanistic inhibitors, and uniform
guidance thereon.
IV. A RATIONAL PROPOSAL (OR TWO)
It is manifestly clear that, as either an imaginary fence or a practical
wall,165 the Market-Wide Circuit Breakers’ greatest effect will continue to
be on the behavior of the institutions and the experts. Experts, situated
literally or figuratively on an exchange trading floor, are most likely to
augment a decline and thus warrant a “cooling off period.” Likewise, the
Limit-Up Limit Down mechanism, triggered all too often, will require
rounds of fine tuning to better serve its purpose of protecting the individual
stock trader. In order to truly stave off the prolonged, decimating volatility
that cripples households and savings, more meaningful changes need to be
effected at several levels.
A. Legislative Reform
Although the Dodd-Frank Reform Act of 2010 did much to restore
investor confidence, the law did nothing to enhance regulation of stock
exchange trading. Additionally, despite the SEC’s implementation of a
version of the discarded uptick rule in 2010,166 the protections afforded by
163
Regulation SHO and Rule 10A-1, Exchange Act Release No. 34-55970, 90 S.E.C. Docket 2604,
2007 WL 1880054, at *1 (June 28, 2007).
164
See, e.g., Mark McQueen, Bring Back the “Uptick” Rule, WELLINGTON FIN. (Sept. 9, 2007),
http://www.wellingtonfund.com/blog/2007/09/09/bring-back-the-uptick-rule/#axzz2f1WjmXQY,
(detailing post-repeal trading days in 2007 that outpaced 1987 for volatility); E.S. Browning, New Rules
for Picking a Bottom?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2007, at C1.
165
Aouriri et al., supra note 100 (“Statistical evidence suggest that about 2/3 of the Mar[.]-Apr[.]
1994 down slide was caused by the program traders trying to lock in their profits before all hell broke
loose.”).
166
Press Release, SEC, SEC Approves Short Selling Restrictions (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.sec.
gov/news/press/2010/2010-26.htm (describing agency adoption of Rule 201, an alternative uptick rule
restricting short selling in any stock that has dropped more than 10% in one day).
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the original seventy-year-old version are still needed. This remedy should
be popular among academics and aggrieved market players alike: it involves
simply resurrecting prior language, practices, and enforcement
mechanisms.167
Further, the present efforts to establish an SEC foothold in the daily
review of trading across markets—e.g., the standardized audit trail168—
should be subordinated to the creation of meaningful coordination of halts
and resulting prices across markets. Stated bluntly, unifying trading results
onto a single scorecard should be placed second to the goal of informing
those making investment decisions why and how often stock trading has
stopped and restarted.
B. Administrative Change
The exchanges have successfully impressed upon officials in
Washington, D.C. and beyond the need to keep markets open during periods
of extreme volatility.169 Whether it be by lobbying the President to avoid a
period of respite (i.e., 1987), or through rule proposals that include minimal
trading pauses (i.e., 2010 and 2012), the exchanges have attained buy-in to
not only the notion that “the show must go on” but also that only they can
choose the musical score.
To be sure, as the purported experts, many administrative agencies
enjoy judicial deference. However, the SEC enjoys a protectorate over the
stock exchanges that may be unsurpassed. Deference to the SEC on
minimally technical questions has rendered the possibility of judicial
intervention remote.170 Decades ago the Third Circuit went so far as to
mock a private litigant who challenged SEC rulemaking regarding price
spreads, declaring that “[a] court is no better equipped to decide whether a
securities dealer must disclose the price at which it buys its wares and
whether its profits are unconscionable than it is to decide the same questions
as to those who sell hamburgers, jewelry, or any other product.”171
Simply put, the SEC needs to be held more accountable to its public
167
See, e.g., McQueen, supra note 164; The SEC Uptick Rule Change: Bad Timing for a Bad Idea,
TICKER SENSE (Mar. 20, 2008), http://tickersense.typepad.com/ticker_sense/2008/03/the-sec-uptick.html;
see also David P. McCaffrey, Review of the Policy Debate Over Short Sale Regulation During the
Market Crisis, 73 ALB. L. REV. 483, 516 (2010).
168
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
169
See, e.g., Staff Legal Bulletin No. 8, SEC (Sept. 8, 1998), http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/
slbmr8.htm (stating the views of the SEC's Division of Market Regulation about the need for
broker/dealers to maintain enough internal systems capacity to operate properly when trading volume is
high); see also NYSE Rule 51 (2013), http://rules.nyse.com/NYSETools/bookmark.asp?id=sx-policy
manual-nyseDealingsupontheExchangeR5156&manual=/nyse/rules/nyse-rules/
(requiring
NYSE
member firms to remain open “for the transaction of business on every business day”).
170
See, e.g., Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. SEC, 923 F.2d 1270, 1272–73 (7th Cir. 1991) (deferring to
the Commission on statutory interpretation of the term “exchange”).
171
Ettinger v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 84-3925, 1986 WL 36297, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 22, 1986), judgment rev’d in part, vacated in part, 835 F.2d 1031 (3d Cir. 1987).
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comment process. A prime example here is Regulation SHO, the tepid set
of reforms adopted during the last decade by the agency in response to
widespread dissatisfaction with the regulation of short selling. As one
commentator noted:
The overwhelming majority of the over 4,300 comments the
SEC received on the final proposal favored new restrictions
on short sales. Most favoring new restrictions called for
restraints that were tighter than the SEC's final rule. The
numerous comments by individual investors, and the
demands by legislators for new controls, demonstrated
vividly the longstanding suspicion of short selling. Thus,
there was a striking gap between the research on the effects
of short selling and political sentiment favoring
restrictions.172
Moreover, while the retail investor has become vital to the success
of the American stock exchange, far more responsible for its ups and downs
than hedge funds,173 his voice remains unheeded. More specifically,
although the SEC opened the Limit-Up-Limit-Down for public comment in
2011,174 some stark yet accurate observations were largely disregarded in the
mechanism’s final manifestation.175
In short, the SEC public comment process is not working, and
federal courts pose little obstacle to a strong-minded federal agency.176 The
SEC rulemaking process must be modified to closely tie the substance of
final rules more closely to the spirit—if not, the word—of the comment
submissions from investors. The Office of Management and Budget can
monitor the agency’s progress in this regard.
C. Protection For the Long Term Investor
More pointedly, the voice of those not situated on the exchange
trading floor need to be heeded in formulating responses and remedies to
intolerable volatility. The stock market was rescued twenty years ago by the
influx of investments from pension funds.177 Nowadays, while consistently
172

McCaffrey, supra note 167, at 516.
See Smith, supra note 14, at 18; see also LEWIS, supra note 66, at 61–62 (contrasting the bond
market and stock market, and noting the presence of “millions” of retail investors in the stock market led
to a perception of greater fairness in the stock market).
174
See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-67090, 103 S.E.C. Docket
2754, 2012 WL 1963372, at *4–6 (May 31, 2012).
175
Id. at *56; see also Rosenbaum, supra note 122.
176
See, e.g., WILLIAM F. FOX, UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 168 (6th ed. 2012) (“[S]ome
cases in which agency rulemaking has been overturned because the agency failed to address significant
comments in the preamble to the final rule.”).
177
See GASPARINO, supra note 72, at 102 (“By the mid- to late 1990s . . . [s]mall investors were
flocking to the markets in droves. Much of it was out of necessity with the end of company pension
plans, which forced people to save for retirement through 401(k) and other investment plans.”).
173
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boasting of the number of pensions and large plans invested in the stock
market,178 the exchanges have concurrently forgotten the needs of such
investors. Pensions and other funds with long term goals are notoriously
cautious to act, as well as diversified in holdings.179 It is commonly
accepted that the appeal of the mutual fund is its unwavering strategy: it is
designed to gradually prosper and avoid market imprudence or excess.180
Indeed, those managing pension funds are often lampooned for their
stereotypical inability or unwillingness to change course.181
This deliberate approach to the market, while universal, was
nonetheless a very poor match for the 2008–2009 Swoon, as confessed by
one sizeable fund:
How Your Pension Benefits Are Invested
The Trustees of our Fund oversee and monitor the work of
our Investment Team, which handles the day-to-day
management of the Fund’s investments. The team works
with a variety of investment managers to ensure that the
Fund’s assets are invested in a broad array of investment
opportunities within the allocation policy set by the
Trustees, maximizing returns while protecting against
losses. This disciplined and diversified investment strategy
served us and other funds well for many years. But the
economy’s dramatic plunge in 2008 hit all areas across the
board and no asset class, and therefore, no pension fund was
immune.182
Market losses devastate the investments of large entities; however,
these entities, mammoth by design, are slow to react to daily market
178
See Hibah Yousuf, Investors Pour Record $8 Billion into U.S. Stocks, CNN MONEY (Jan. 17,
2013), http://buzz.money.cnn.com/2013/01/17/stocks-funds-inflows/ (detailing the highest mutual fund
investment in U.S. markets in one week since such records began being tallied in 2007).
179
See, e.g., The Economy and Your Pension Funds, 1199SEIU FUNDS, http://1199seiubenefits.org/
fund-features/fund-spotlights/spotlight-on-pension-and-retirement/the-economy-and-your-pension-funds/
(last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 1199SEIU is one of the largest pension plans in the nation. About us:
History and Accomplishments, 1199SEIU FUNDS, http://1199seiubenefits.org/about-1199seiu-funds/
who-we-are/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
180
See, e.g., RUSSELL KINNEL, FUNDSPY: MORNINGSTAR’S INSIDE SECRETS TO SELECTING MUTUAL
FUNDS THAT OUTPERFORM 50 (2009), (“You want [fund] managers that stick to their guns and do not
chase what’s trendy at the moment.”). The advice to avoid short-term goals rings even more clearly for
the direct retail investor; see also Andrea Coombes, Should 401(k) Savers Bail on Bond Funds?,
MARKET WATCH (July 11, 2013, 6:01 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/should-401k-saversbail-on-bond-funds-2013-07-12 (“Many investors hit the ‘sell’ button on bonds in June—but if your
focus is on retirement, think through your options before you follow the crowd.”).
181
See, e.g., Mom and Pop Investors Miss out on Stock Market Gains, MONEYNEWS (Sept. 30, 2012,
4:01 PM), http://www.moneynews.com/InvestingAnalysis/investors-retail-stock-market/2012/09/30/id/
458138 (citing the “inertia” of retirement accounts invested in the stock market).
182
The Economy and Your Pension Funds, 1199SEIU FUNDS, http://1199seiubenefits.org/fundfeatures/fund-spotlights/spotlight-on-pension-and-retirement/the-economy-and-your-pension-funds/ (last
visited Feb. 24, 2014).
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moves.183 When passive, such entities are openly decried in financial
periodicals.184 When reacting to the market, these fiduciaries are still,
nonetheless, faulted. For example, the California State Retirement System
dramatically altered its investment strategy nine months after the
commencement of the 2008–2009 Swoon to only lukewarm praise.185
Further, any fundamental switch in strategy draws the ire of stakeholders
and observers alike.186 Despite the sizable presence of such plans in the
market, lawsuits aimed at slowing wholesale changes such as mergers and
bailouts are notoriously unsuccessful.187 Further still, as the Second Circuit
recently reminded us, those charged with recalibrating investment strategies
for such entities are given great latitude and owe a very forgiving fiduciary
duty to pension plan participants.188
All of which supports the notion that the stock exchanges, which
benefit mightily from the business of pension plans and similar grouped
investments, must: (1) more meaningfully impose trading halts, and (2)
more equitably publicize these halts. Market-Wide Circuit Breakers need to
trigger more frequently—i.e., for more than merely one to two hours—and
in lockstep coordination with all the major stock exchanges. In this regard,
the individual Market- Wide breakers would do well to mimic the LULD’s
targeted focus upon the national market system stock.189

183
See John Seiler, Market Crash Slams State Pension Funds, BEFORE IT’S NEWS (Aug. 9, 2011,
3:11 PM), http://beforeitsnews.com/libertarian/2011/08/new-market-crash-slams-state-pension-funds928777.html (“[CalPERS] just can’t beat the market. Fundamentally, they are the market.”) (quoting
Dan Pellissier, President of California Pension Reform).
184
See Aaron Elstein, NY State’s Pension Fund is 26% Poorer, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (May 29, 2009,
8:55 AM), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20090529/FREE/905299995 (reporting losses of 26%
in the fund for the fiscal year ending March 2009).
185
See Press Release, California State Teachers Retirement System, CalSTRS Acts in Face of
Historic Global Market Drop (July 21, 2009), http://www.calstrs.com/news-release/calstrs-acts-facehistoric-global-market-drop (Describes the pension fund’s “shifting [of] 5 percent of the portfolio from
global equities to fixed income, real estate and private equity to purchase quality assets from distressed
sellers” and another five percent “to create a new asset class,” and adoption of “a new asset allocation
mix that further diversifies the portfolio while reducing its stake in the global stock markets”).
186
See Michael Kranish, Pension Insurer Shifted to Stocks: Concern Increases as Losses Mount;
Failing Plans Could Overwhelm Agency, BOSTON GLOBE, March 30, 2009, at A1 (noting criticism from,
among other observers, the White House).
187
See Press Release, California State Teachers Retirement System, California Public Pension Funds
Seek to Lead Bank of America Class Actions (Mar. 23, 2009), http://www.calstrs.com/newsrelease/california-public-pension-funds-seek-lead-bank-america-class-actions (discussing the lawsuit,
which was ultimately unsuccessful, that sought to block the merger between Bank of America and
Merrill Lynch).
188
See, e.g., Mark Hamblett, Circuit Rejects Suit by Lehman Retirees Who Lost Savings, N.Y.L.J.,
July 16, 2013, at 1 (describing the Second Circuit’s dismissal of plaintiff class’ ERISA claims against
“executives and directors” alleged to have breached fiduciary duties to Lehman Brothers retirees when
the Lehman Stock Fund pitted after the eponymous broker-dealer filed for bankruptcy in September
2008). The Second Circuit cited the established standard of “minimal judicial review for challenges to a
fiduciary’s management of an ESOP [Employee Stock Ownership Plan].” Id. (citing Moench v.
Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 566 (3d Cir. 1995)).
189
See supra pp. 20–22 (indicating that the NMS stocks are at the core of the LULD breaker).
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Conversely, the LULD Breaker—confused in mission190 and
complicated in design191—needs to be simplified and meaningfully
broadcasted, as opposed to merely publishing it in a chart.192 If a stock is
trading wildly, that news should be made widely and immediately available
to parties situated on the trading floor and elsewhere. Even such a broadcast
rule for only part of the trading day would pose meaningful change; the
most recent data demonstrates the most reputable of stock issues tend to
fluctuate most within two hours of opening, thus making a “morning
window” for universal dissemination of the news of a halt a truly useful
tool.193
D. Atmospheric Change
The Federal Reserve remains the insurer of our stock exchange’s
liquidity.194 A more frequent transition in that storied agency’s head195
could inspire more frequent adjustments to exchange remedial measures in
general and circuit breaker triggers in particular. Even the present White
House, which in 2010 successfully ushered through regulatory reform
against a sea of opposition, needs to question the continued support for the
delegation of all meaningful supervision to the stock exchanges themselves.
It bears noting that for centuries the American exchanges—themselves
variations on the world model196—unilaterally controlled the publication of
their trading data. Although the finalizing of the national audit trail in 2013,
whereby the SEC will ultimately view daily trading across a variety of
markets,197 appears progressive, that reform relies too heavily on
determinations made at the local level. As the result of a late rulemaking
190
Press Release, SEC, Statement on Meeting With Exchanges (May 10, 2010), http://www.sec.
gov/news/press/2010/2010-74.htm (announcing SEC investigation into whether the Flash Crash was the
result of erroneous trades).
191
See, e.g., Trading Halts Code, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/Trader.aspx?id=Trade
HaltCodes (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). NASDAQ’s web site lists over two dozen “Trade Halt Codes”
(e.g., “Halt – News Released”). Id. The code labeled “T5: Single Stock Trading Pause in Effect” appears
to most approximate the initial breaker inspired by the May 2010 Flash Crash. Id.
192
See Quast, supra note 108.
193
See, e.g., Historical Prices: International Business Machines Corporation (IBM), YAHOO FIN.,
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=IBM (last visited Feb. 24, 2014) (showing the minute-by-minute price
of IBM, which moved from $189.16 per share at 10:05 a.m. on August 9, 2013 to $187 at 11:00 a.m.);
Historical Prices: Google, Inc., YAHOO FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=GOOG (last visited Feb.
24, 2014) (showing the price of Google, Inc., which moved from $892.49 at 10:00 a.m. to $892.15 at
10:15 a.m. during the same trading day).
194
See A. Scott Berg, A League of His Own, VANITY FAIR, Aug. 2013, at 70 (explaining the creation
of the Federal Reserve as one of President Woodrow Wilson’s most progressive innovations).
195
Binyamin Appelbaum, Uncertainty at Fed Over its Stimulus Plans and Its Leadership, N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 2013, at B1 (“Only three people have held the Fed chairmanship in the last 30 years. . .
.”). In February 2014, Janet Yellen took over the position of Federal chair. Sam Frizell, Janet Yellen
Sworn in to Lead Federal Reserve, TIME (Feb. 3, 2014), http://time.com/3866/janet-yellen-sworn-in-tolead-federal-reserve/.
196
Escobar, supra note 18 (“Over in America, it took nearly another century for our first official
stock exchange to emerge.”).
197
In 2012 the SEC mandated that all exchanges share trade data in hopes of creating a truly
“consolidated” daily audit trail. See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text.
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compromise, the exchanges themselves can determine the timing and
inclusion of error and other select forms of trades.198
Until such time as volatility is minimized on broad, meaningful
levels, the retail investor remains as vulnerable as the uninformed stock
customers decried 100 years ago by Louis Brandeis. Simply put, stock
exchanges need to involve disinterested parties in operational decisionmaking. Such participation would inevitably lengthen breaks and provide
greater accessibility to news thereof throughout the trading day. Addressing
even one or two of these pressing needs would work to forestall prolonged
periods of decline. At the present time, none of the volatility mechanisms
address any of these needs.
V. CONCLUSION
Nearly 50 years ago, John Kenneth Galbraith wrote, “[o]f all the
mysteries of the stock exchange there is none so impenetrable as why there
should be a buyer for everyone who seeks to sell. October 24, 1929, showed
that what is mysterious is not inevitable.”199 Likewise, as disastrous events
such as the 2008–2009 Swoon or the 2010 Flash Crash amply indicate, the
predictability of a fair, timely purchase/sale of stock on a stock exchange—
or the continuous existence of that exchange—should not be taken lightly.
It bears noting that the decision to keep a stock exchange open is not free
from conflict of interest: both the exchanges200 and the federal government
earn fees from exchange transactions,201 whether these deals result from
nearly unfathomable amounts of daily trades in both Bull and Bear Markets.
The optimal solution to our volatile markets would probably lie
somewhere between a complete ban of so-called “flash trading,”202 free
distribution of market prices and transactions,203 and faster interaction by
198

See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text.
See GALBRAITH, supra note 43, at 99.
See NYSE Information Memo No. 96-12, supra note 19. The stock exchanges charge a
commission to each member based upon revenues (calculated by shares executed) that is required by rule
to be meticulously and timely tallied each month. Id. (explaining that monthly form 600TC required of
all members must record floor brokerage revenue that “include[s] income received from non-member
broker-dealers as well as public institutional and retail customers”).
201
15 U.S.C. § 78ee (2012). The SEC, per statute, collects fees from stock exchanges as determined
by the amount of trading volume. Id.; Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 31b, at http://www.law.uc.
edu/sites/default/files/CCL/34Act/sec31.html (“(b) EXCHANGE-TRADED SECURITIES—Subject to
subsection (j), each national securities exchange shall pay to the Commission a fee at a rate equal to $15
per $1,000,000 of the aggregate dollar amount of sales of securities (other than bonds, debentures, other
evidences of indebtedness, security futures products, and options on securities indexes (excluding a
narrow-based security index)) transacted on such national securities exchange.”).
202
The SEC proposed a complete ban on the practice in 2009, but the practice nonetheless continues
under an exception to SEC Rule 602. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes Flash Order Ban (Sept. 17,
2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-201.htm.
203
See NYSE, nyse.nyx.com (last visited Feb. 24, 2014) (click NYSE MKT tab under Market
Movers heading). The Stock Exchange still charges a fee for real-time information; the information on
their web sites is 15 minutes delayed. Id.
199
200
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money managers with rapidly changing indices.204 On the former point,
textbook authors have aptly noted the following:
As a public policy matter, flash orders raise concerns of
fairness and market stability. First, investors cannot reap
profits from flash trading without access to computing
power that is prohibitively expensive to the average
investor.
While other trading strategies (statistical
arbitrage, for example) are dependent upon significant
processing power, success at these strategies still seems
primarily determined by ability (either in programming or
analysis). To some, flash orders have arguably crossed the
line dividing skilled traders harnessing computer power to
realize their ideas to just trading ahead of the market.205
But, until the practice of flatly outlawing computerized advantages takes
hold, artificial brakes on the imbalanced market remain the best means of
preventing a complete market meltdown. The trick, it would seem, is to
make such breaks longer, more connected, better publicized, and more
consistent with the findings of public scrutiny.
The danger of inaction may come from the “invisible hand”206 itself.
More recently, large stock brokerage firms or their affiliates have
increasingly created internal “dark pools” to fill customer orders; these
arrangements, among other things, provide more anonymity for customer
orders.207 Moreover, frustrated by a marketplace that increasingly appears
to favor high-frequency traders, there has emerged a drive to slow down
trading.208 One of Canada’s largest financial institutions has modified its
New York trading desk to actually weaken the pace of its customers’ orders
– and thus evade the software utilized by the quickest of traders.209 While
the bank has lobbied for regulatory changes, it has simultaneously embraced
a trading model that seeks to achieve customer loyalty at the expense of
volume of commissions. The move is credited with the firm’s rise to “ninth
largest broker for American stocks.”210
Indeed, the inability of pension plans and other glacially-paced
market players to compete is of direct consequence to a vast number of
204

See supra notes 169–76 and accompanying text.
SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 83, at 905 (footnote omitted).
See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 288 (1776) (coining the phrase the “invisible hand”
of the market to indicate, among other things, remedies emanating from the private sector).
207
Nathaniel Popper, Regulators Fret Over Rise of Trading in the Shadows, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1,
2013, at B1 (noting that the percentage of “stock trading taking place away from the public exchanges”
had increased to close to 40% since an average of 16% in 2008).
208
See Nathaniel Popper, Royal Bank of Canada Gains by Putting the Brakes on Traders,
DEALBOOK (June 25, 2013, 7:57 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/25/royal-bank-of-canadagains-by-putting-the-brakes-on-traders/.
209
Id.
210
Id. (noting that Royal Bank was ranked 18th in 2010).
205
206
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investors; regardless of the debate over the market’s effect upon nest eggs in
the last five years, the fact remains that by 2014 approximately 20% of
Americans will work past age 65.211 Clearly, pensions need the protection
of the trading centers that benefit from their trading activity.
One hundred years ago, Brandeis coined the haunting phrase “Other
People’s Money” to connote a callousness in financial relations that would
foreshadow catastrophe on a macroeconomic level. He concluded his
eponymous work with a quote from President Woodrow Wilson: “[e]very
country is renewed out of the ranks of the unknown, not out of the ranks of
the already famous and powerful in control.”212 The two men might as well
have aimed their concerns at the stock exchanges, time-honored but feared
market centers that now—for better or worse—hold our collective fates. It
is likely that the time has come to wrest the stopgap measures from those
undesirous of stoppage, but seemingly enamored of (wealth) gaps.213
Outside forces may now need to determine when, how often, and for how
long the trading stops, as well as how the stops are communicated.
The upside of generating market confidence is self evident, as there
is more American currency in circulation now than at any other time in
history.214 Yet, even while the nation is enjoying another dazzling Bull
Market, a new skepticism has also arisen.215 Simply put, it is imperative that
the SEC, the White House, Congress, the courts, and the stock exchanges
themselves commence acting with a sense of urgency to more meaningfully
stabilize trading in the marketplaces that—for better or worse—serve as
both originator and mirror of the nation’s economy.
Of course, the greatest volatility confronting the nation’s exchanges
may take the face of competitiveness, as the number of exchanges is
dwindling216 and the cyberspace model has supplanted Hollywoodesque
visions of trading floors. Abroad, few seemed concerned with the level of
scrutiny attending daily stock exchange operations.217 Domestically, our
211

Katy Steinmetz, The Game of Happiness, TIME, July 8–15, 2013, at 45.
See BRANDEIS, supra note 9, at 223.
Rana Foroohar, The Risks of Reviving A Revived Economy, TIME (Nov. 7, 2012), http://
swampland.time.com/2012/11/07/the-risks-of-reviving-a-revived-economy/ (Discusses IMF research that
countries with bigger wealth gaps tend to have shorter periods of high growth and generally “more
volatile economies”).
214
Briefing, TIME, July 22, 2013, at 11 (noting $1.19 trillion in circulation at the end of June 2013).
215
See Maureen Farrell, Doomsday Investors Betting on Market Crash, CNN MONEY (May 23, 2013,
7:14 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/05/24/investing/hedge-funds-crash/index.html (describing the
success of a company presently selling “crash protection” to banks and pension funds as part of the new
financial art of “‘black swan’ hedging”).
216
See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-67037, 103 S.E.C. Docket
2604, 2012 WL 1865429, at *1 (May 21, 2012) (granting permission for the elimination of the term
“Amex” from the remnants of the absorbed American Stock Exchange).
217
See France Implements Bail-In, DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL (July 23, 2013), http://
www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/07.23.13.France.Implements.Bail_.In__0.pdf (detailing French
measures to address supervisory frameworks, the separation of proprietary and customer trading
212
213
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leaders have identified bank liquidity,218 SEC image,219 pernicious trading
practices,220 and unemployment221 as the culprits requiring our most
immediate attention. To its credit, the SEC has placed intolerable volatility
due to “trading glitches” on its extremely busy agenda.222 But though the
stock exchange does remain at the center of our economic fate,223 holding
captive our nest eggs and measuring a trading day in billions of dollars, its
operations and its halts must immediately be made more equitable and
productive.
The modern American stock exchange and its crashes are very
complicated beasts with conflicting causes. While we struggle to both feed
and contain the exchange Leviathan, let us nonetheless recognize that it
must sometimes be put to sleep, if only to give us time to flee.

activities, and limits to fees on customers – but failing to note any concern over the volatility of the
Parisian Bourse).
218
See Basel III Leverage Ratio: U.S. Proposes American Add-on; Basel Committee Proposes
Important Denominator Changes, DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL (July 19, 2013), http://www.davispolk.
com/sites/default/files/07.19.13.Basel_.3.Leverage.pdf (Describes the late-hour proposal to require
insured depositary subsidiaries of bank holding companies to maintain a “supplementary leverage ratio of
at least 6%”).
219
Rakoff’s Revenge, ECONOMIST, April 13, 2013 (“T[he] Senate unanimously approved Mary Jo
White on April 8th to lead America’s Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on the basis of her
reputation as a prosecutor and defence attorney.”).
220
See Nathaniel Popper, Finra Scrutinizes High-Speed Trading Firms, DEALBOOK (July 18, 2013,
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